Male-Female Differences in Wages and Employment: A Specific Human Capital Model by Elisabeth M. Landes
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




CENTERFOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF IIIJMANBEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
NationalBureauof Economic Research. Inc.
261 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
January 1974
Preliminary; Not for Quotation
NBER working papers are distributed informally and in limited
number for comments only. They should not be quoted without written
permission.
This report has not undergone the review accorded official NBER
publications; in particular, it has not yet been submitted for approval
by the Board of Directors.
The research reported' herein was supported by, a Ford Foundation
program grant to NBER for research in population economics.CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The labor force activity of women has changed dramatically during
the postwar period. Between 1940 and 1971 the labor force participa-
tion rates of women rose from 27.4 per cent to 42.5 per cent. Since
1960, over 60 per cent of the increase in the total labor force Is
acccrnnted for by women, and 72.3 per cent of that proportion by married
women. This rapid increase in labor force participation has brought
into sharp relief the different patterns of employment and compensa-
tion existing between men and women in the American labor market. The
greater part of the increase in women workers between 1960 and 1971
were absorbed into a single malor occupation group: clerical workers.
In 1971, more than one out of three female workers was in a clerical
occupation; more than 50 per cent were either clerical or service
workers. There is no comparable occupational concentration for male
workers.
Hand—in—hand with the large disparity in occupational distribu-
tion between men and women is the existence of differential earnings.
In 1971 median weekly earnings for full—time wage and salary workers
were $162 for males, $100 for females. Much of this difference in
earnings can be accounted for by the different occupational distri—
butlons of men and women; women tend to be concentrated in lower
paying occupations. However, differential wages exist by detailed
occupational classification as well.The most commonly alleged forces behind sex differences in occupa-
tional distribution and compensation is discrimination, by employers,
1
workers, and consumers. Legislation has been passed and government
agencies established to combat discrimination through the legal system.
Economists have also focused much of their efforts in the area of
wage and employment differences by sex on identifying and measuring
discrimination. Henry Sanborn2 implicitly defined discrimination as
unequal pay for equal work in his paper investigating earnings dif-
ferentials. Standardizing male and female earnings by occupational
distribution and hours worked, he still found approximately a 24 per
cent differential between men and women, using 1950 Census data and
Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational surveys. However, he was able
to isolate employment within given plants for a subset of male and female
operatives, and found that within plant standardized earnings differen-
tials were less than 10 per cent on average. He concluded that his re—
suits were compatible with the existence of employee or consumer dis-
crimination hut not discrimination against women by employers.
1For example:
a. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, which requires equal pay for
equal. work.
b. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which bars dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
sex, or national origin.
c. Executive Order 11246 of 1965, as amended by Executive
Order 11375 of October, 1967, which bars discrimination
by federal contractors.
2Henry Sanborn, "Pay Differences between Men and Women," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Volume 17, July 1964.Victor Fuchs came to a similar conclusion in his work on hourly
wage differentials between males and females. He found that the rela-
tive hourly wage of females could be raised by only onepercentage point,
from 60 to 61 per cent of the male hourly wage, by adjusting forcolor,
schooling, age, and city size, and by an additional five points to 66
per cent by adjusting further for marital status, class of worker, and
length of trip to work. This finding suggests that differences in labor
"quality" or ability play a very small role in determining differential
compensation. However, his work presents evidence counter—indicative
of employer discrimination. For example, he finds self—employment to
have a significant negative partial effect on the relative hourlyearn-
ings of females, which is contrary to the implication of the employer
discrimination hypothesis. Nevertheless, Fuchs concludes that his re-
sults are compatible with the existence of discrimination by coworkers
or consumers.
Ronald Oaxaca4 attempted to identify the effect of discrimination
on hourly earnings of women analysing data from the 1967 Survey of
Economic Opportunity. His assumption is that discrimination is mani-
fested through employers paying men and women differently for their
personal market characteristics. By estimating an hourly earnings func-
tion for individuals of four sex—race categories, he found that discrim-
ination accounted for more than 75 per cent of theaverage wage differential
3Victor Fuchs, "Differencesin Hourly Earnings Between Men and
Women," Monthly Labor Review, Volume 94, No. 5, May 1971.
4Ronald Oaxaca, "SexDiscrimination in Wages,t' (paper presented at
the Conference on Discrimination in Labor Markets, October 1971.)4
between white males and white females, and for at least 88 per cent of
the differential between black males and black females.
The error in this effort is that at no time did Oaxaca attempt to
determine the behavioral causes of different coefficients for males and
females in the earnings function other than discrimination.
More recent work by economists has focused on the fact that sini—
ficant differences in the labor market behavior of males and females
exist which could give rise to differentials even in the absence of dis—
crimination by employers, consumers, or coworkers. The unique roles of
men and women within marriage and the family imply different patterns of
participation in the market and different investment in market oriented
skills. Despite the rapid increase in labor force participation of
women, their participation rates remain much lower than those ofmen.5
Fuchs also considers the effects of these forces in his paper. The
1960 Census One—in—One--Thousand Sample does not include direct data on
labor turnover of males and females. However, the sharp decrease in
relativeearnings with increasing age suggests to Fuchs that 'much of
the overall differential is related to the more casual attachment of worn—
mento the labor force and to sex differences in post—school investment."
Solomon Polachek6 estimates the effect that anticipated intervals
5Signiflcant contributions to the understanding of female labor supply
behavior were made by Jacob Mincer in "Labor Force Participation of Mairied
Women,"Asps of Labor Economics, Universities—National.Bureau of Economic
Research Conference Series 1.5 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962),
by Glen Cain in Married Women in theLaborForce (Chicago: University of
ChicagoPress, 1965), and by William Bowen and T. Aldrich Finegan in The
Economics of Labor Force Paricpation(Princeton:Princeton University
Press, 1969).
6Solomon Polachek, "Work Expert once and the 1)1fferenceRetween Male
and Female Wages'' (Unpublished Ph .1). di ssertatIon,Columbia flniverRity,1973)out of the labor force have on optimal post—school human capital invest-
ments made by women, and therefore on their earnings. Heemployed educa—
tion—, marital status—, age— and sex—specific labor forceparticipation
rates to estimate the optimal volume of human capital investment for
married—once, spouse—present males and females, and single, never married
males and females. Using these expected capitalmeasures as independent
variables in the earnings function in place of the usualexposure terms
results in the reduction of the discrimination coefficient, here defined
as the coefficient of a dummy regressor which takes the valueone if the
individual is a female and zero for a male, by about 80per cent for
married—once, spouse—present males and females, the group for which the
earnings differential is the largest.
In an extension of Polachek's analysis, Mincer and Polachek7measure
the depreciation effect that intermittent periods of labor forcewith-
drawal have on the woman's human capital stock, which isan additional
depressant to female earnings. They use data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Work Experience for Women, 30—44, which permits
isolating periods of market activity and of market withdrawal for in-
dividual women. By estimating earnings functions forwomen, segmenting
their work histories into periods of market work and homework, they
find significant depreciation of earnings for marriedwomen caused by
periods out of the labor force. Mincer and Polachek estimate that the
segmented pattern of participation of women, through its implications
for both human capital investment and depreciation,accounts for about
7Jacoh Mincer and SolomonPolachek, 'Famflv Investments in Human
Capital: Earnings of Women," forthcoming Journal of PoliticalFcoriy.6
50 per cent of the observed earnings differential between married men
and married women, the group for whom the earnings differential is the
largest.
Differential labor force turnover patterns between males and females
affect not only self—financed human capital accumulation and depreciation,
hut also imply differential Incentives to the firm to invest in firm—speci-
fic training of males and females. Clearly, If females are expected to
have higher firm—leaving rates than males, they represent a less desirable
investment. Table 1 presents data on median year on current lob by sex
and major occupation group, for the years 1951, 1963, 1966, and 1968. Ve
can get some idea of the magnitude of these differences in terms of turn-
over rates by employing the assumption that the underlying turnover rates
are constant each year. These statistics are presented in Table 2. Tables
1 and 2 show a pattern of Increasing turnover rates for bothmenand women
in the period 1963—68, during theupturnof the business cycle. Because
of the expected pattern of quit and layoff rates8 over the business cycle,
this increase can be interpreted as being due solely to increasing quit
rates. Table 2 reveals that with the Increase in turnover of both males
and females In this period, the difference in turnover rates has increased
both absolutely and relatively. Part of this increase may be due to the
differential incidence of layoff during this period. Hen, as primary
workers, are embodied with more specific Investment than women, and so
their layoff rate will decline relative to females over the business
cycle. In the postwar period, a significant part of the increase in
8
Donald Parsons, 'Specific Human Capital: Layoffs and Quits"





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the female labor force was due to the entrance of older married women,
who may have found employment in occupations or industries which have
9
lower skill requirements and therefore higher turnover rates.Age—
specific tenure data is also available for the years 1951, 1963, 1966,
and 1968, and presented in Table 3. These data are then converted into
the turnover data presented in Table 4. Table 5 shows the absolute and
relative differences in turnover rates increasi.n during the period 1963
to 1968 within age—specific categories, for the prime labor force age
categories. The relationship is reversed for new entrants, aged 20—24,
where females have lowere job leaving rates than males, hut Increases
for older cohorts.
This paper analyzes the effects of differential turnover patterns
and the existence of firm specific training, jointly financed by em-
ployer and employee, on male—female wage and employment differentials.
Chapter 2 presents a model of a firm that invests in the training of
its workers, where employee turnover represents depreciation on human
capital. Differences in the turnover rates of men and women is shown
to be an important determinant of the incentive to the employer to hire
and train women as well as men. The empirical implications of the model
for the relative wage and occupational distribution of women are con-
trasted with those derived from a model of general human capital invest-
ment. Chapter 3 outlines the problems involved in empirical formulation
of the model, the choice of the unit of observation for empirical, test-
ing, and data limitations, and presents the results of empirical testing
9
Parsons, ibid.Table 3
MedianYears on the Job by Age and by Sex
1951, 1963, 1966, 1968
________ 1963b__________1966c 1965d
T1
Source:a) U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Retort #36, Series P—SO, 'Experience
of Workers at Their CurrentJob, January J951.
b)U.S.,Departmentof Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
peciai Labor Force Report #36, "Job Tenure of American
Workers, January 1963."
c) U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Special Labor Force Report, "Job Tenure of Workers, January
1966."
d) U.S., I)epartment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
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Turnover Rates by Age and by Sex,









































































The figures presented in this table are constructedfrom the data presented in Table 3 in the samemanner as the figures pre- sented in Table 2constructed from the data in Table 1. This

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 of the model on aggregate occupational data for males and females from
the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. In Chapter 4, the model Is
applied to occupational data from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity
for black and white men as an additional test of its applicability and
empirical power. Chapter 5 summarizes the empirical findings and eon—
clusions of the paper.14
CHAPTER2
AModel of Specific HumanCapitalInvestment In Workers:
Implications for the Relative Wage and Occupational
Distribution of Women
I. The Model
The framework of analysis is a model of the firm which produces two
outputs: X, a final good to he marketed, and T*, skilled labor, an inter-
mediateinput into the production ofX.
x= x(T*) (1)
T*=q'Tt
The output of X is defined by a production function for each neriod usin,
asingle input, T*, and subject to constant returns to scale. Skilled
labor, T, is produced by a Cobb—Douglas oroductior function involving two
inputs: T, which Is conventional labor, or bodies, and q, the number of
units of humancapitalinvestment embodied in each of the T workers. a is
a measure of the elasticity of the effectiveness' of labor with respect
to training. The only restriction on ctisthat it be non—negative; this
goes one step beyond the convention of defining skilled labor as the quan-
tity invested per conventional laborer multiplied bythenumber of laborers
(i.e., a 1).
The firm is sub-ject to labor turnover, sothat
T=P T+1 . (2)
t tt—l t
thestock of workers during a given period t in the firm's life, is
equal to the proportion of workers who remained on the lob from period
t—l, Ttj, T' workers hired and trained in period t.
Thefirm can affect p, the proportion of workers rematning on thejob from one period to the next, by offering a wage rate somewhat higher
than the alternative wage of the employees. To the extent that the em-
ployer has financed the human capital investment in his workers, he will
seek to share the costs and returns of this investment in order to reduce




where W is the per period compensation of the T workers, and WA is their
highest alternative wage.
Human capital investment per worker, q, is produced at a cost to the
firm. We assume increasing marginal cost of investment per worker: marginal
costs increase with the intensity of investment. In addition, hiring of new
workers, involves search costs to the firm. If costs of search in-
crease with the number of new workers to be hired, then the cost function
per worker of hiring and training new workers can be expressed as
C =C(q,
where C .> 0and c ..> 0.C, as defined in expression (4) is
1 2 ]
essentially a price to the firm for each worker it hires and trains, which
increases with the number hired and the Intensity of training. Total cost
per period of hiring and training I workers Is equal to C(q, 1
The present value of the firm's total return to investment and pro-




—C(q, t1 . (5)
l+r
10
D. Parsons, Ibid.; M. Kuritani, "Specific Training, Employment
Stability and Earnings Distribution in Japan" (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Columbia University, 1973).K is the market price of thefirm's output X, assumed to be constant
over time, and r is the discount rate faced by thefirm.11 The employer
seeks to maximize itsubjectto
TtPt Ti + It
(6)
Pt —p(W;WA)
with respect to the variables he controls: W, q, and
In order to simplify the optimization problem, let us assume that
labor market conditions are not expected to change over firm life, so
that optimal values of W, q, and therefore p arethe same for all
t. Then
T=—. I (7)
and output of X is constant for all t. Expression (5) can be rewritten as
it— E(_J.._-)fkX (q _.._I) —w_i_I—C(q,I) I] .(8)
i+r i—p 1—p
The employer wishes to maximize IT,asexpressed in (8), subject to the new
constraint
p =p(W;WA) . (9)
First order conditions for a maximum are:
c—i 1 (kMP W) —C2(q,I) —C(q,I) <0;0 or I =0
r(l—p) q
11
Infinite firm life is assumed in order to avoid explicit consideration
of the scrap value of the firm at the end of the firm's life. This assump-
tion is not unreasonable in that at the end of the employer's life he is
free to sell the firm. The sale price will depend on the path the firm is
on: the way to assure maximum sale price in this model is to assume an
infinite firm life.C-2
r(l-p) MPqalI -
C1(q,I) 0; =0or q 0
C-3 I+A.2<0;0orw,O
i-p
C-4 -p+p(W;WA)0; =0or A =0
A is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with a constrained maximum
of this type, and is equal to the shadow price of p in this problem.
NP = , themarginal product of skilled labor in the production of
x.
Condition C—i simply states that in equilibrium, the increment in
present value of revenue from an additional person hired and trained
must equal the marginal cost of hiring and training him. C—2 states
that the increment in present value of revenue from investing an
additional unit of training in each worker must just equal the marginal
cost of investment. C—3 states that at the margin, the value of a de-
crease in turnover rates induced by an increase in wage rate must just
equal the additional wage cost required to induce it. These are the
marginal revenue must equal marginal cost conditions of profit maxi-
mization. C—4 simply requires that turnover rates may not be lower
than the firm "production function" of turnover rates permits.
Let us now introduce the difference between male and female work—
wers into the model. Assuming men and women to be perfect substitutes
in production, there may still be differential returns to the employer
from training them because of differential turnover rates, i.e., it is
expected that over some range of wages Pf < Assumea cost curve
per worker of the form
C(qf, If)W0f + aqf + b/2qf2 + clf (10)18
C(q ,I)
—W+aq+ b/2q 2 + ci m m om m m m
Except for Wf and W, the training period wages for males and females,
the functional form of the curve for males and females is identical,
while the level attained depends on the number hired and the quantity
invested per worker. W and W are assumed different, since it is of om
often presumed that women may buy their way into training by taking a
lower wage during the training period, thus compensating the firm for
their higher turnover rates. We assume that In searching for labor,
the employer is searching In two distinct pools, male and female, for
workers of a certain quality. There is some distribution of quality
among workers in each pool. If the cost of search per worker of given
quality increases with the intensity of search within each pooi, the
employer's least cost policy would be to search in both pools, i.e.,
hire both males and females. We assume that these costs will rise at
an equal rate in both pools. However, it would be possible to postulate
them rising at different rates, cf and introduce an additional
distinction between males and females into the model.
When we introduce the distinction between males and females into
the model, the decision is to maximize











Pin-Pmm; WA)The variables used In these expressions are listed and defined in
Table 6. Pf and p are affected by two kinds of job mobility: inter—
and intra—market. The compensated substitution elasticity of inter—
market mobility of market wage rates has been established to be great-
er for females than males.12 However, if the females themselves anti-
cipate a higher probability of leaving the labor force in a given period
of time, the wage elasticity of their intra—tnarket mobility should be
lower than that for males, since the same observed wage differential be-
tween firms or occupations represents a smaller net benefit from migration
to them.
The relative responsiveness of Pf and to changes in wages is not
clear. However, the equilibrium conditions below reveal that even if
Pf <1mfor any wage, females could still be hired; they would simply re-
ceive less training than males, and fewer of them would he hired.
First order conditions for the maximum are:
C—la =1 kMPq —Wf)
—












cL—i —(a+ bqf) i 0 ; =0or qf0
r iPf
C—2bk 1 cPq cl —(a+ bq) 'm 0 ; 0 or a0
12Glen Cain, Married Women in the Labor Force, and Jacob Mincer,
"Labor Force Participation of Married Women," Reuben Cronau, in
"Wage Comparisons —ASelectivity Bias" (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 13, October 1973), suggests that established
estimates of the wage elasticity of female labor force participation
rates may be too high, since the underlying unknown "mean offer wage,"
to which labor force participation is actually responding, varies more
than the observed "average acceptance wage."20
. Table 6
VariablesAppearing. in Txpressions 11 and 12
Variable Name Variable Definition
If The number of females newly hired and trained in
period t.
The number of males newly hired and trained in
period t.
Pf Theproportion of female workers who leave the firm
each period.
Pm The proportion of male workers who leave the firm
each period.
Wf The wage rate paid to femaleworkers in each period,
after the training period.
Wm The wage rate paid to male workers in each period,
after the training period.
Wof The wage rate paid to newly hired female workers
during the training period.
The wage rate paid to newly hired male workers
during the training period.
Wh The home opportunity wage for females.
WA The market opportunity wage for both males and females.
NP The marginal product of skilled labor in production.
qf The quantity of human capital invested per female worker.
The auanity of human capital invested per male worker.
.If +Pf<






Pf+ Pf(Wf; W, WA) 10; =0or 0
c—4b —p +p(W;WA)<O;—Oory —0.
inmm in
andy are the multipliers arising from the constrained maximization.
is the shadow price of Pf and m the shadow price of p in this opti—
mization problem.
Assume that the firm reaches an internal optimum; then all first
order conditions for the maximum can be taken as equalities. Conditions
C—la and C—lb state that the marginal revenue, i.e., the discounted stream
of additional profits, from hiring an additional worker, whether male or
female, must equal the marginal cost of hiring and training him in equilib-
rium. C—2a and C—2b state that the marginal return from Investing one more
unit of training in each worker must equal the marginal cost of training.
C—3a and C—3b state that at the margin, the increase In return from a fall
In turnover rate must just equal the additional wage cost required to in-
duce It. These are the familiar marginal revenue must equal marginal cost
conditions of profit maximization, directly analogous to those presented
for the simple model.22
II. Implications of Specific Human Capital Investment for the
Wages And Occupational Distribution of Women
Equilibrium conditions C—la and C—lb can be combined to form an
"optimal wage differential" equation. In equilibrium






—q)+ b/2(qf — )
+2c(If —I)]
It is clear from the equation that the existence of employer—financed
investment in human capital and differential turnover rates combine to
be a sufficient condition for wage differentials to exist, even in the
absence of any taste for discrimination by employers, co—workers, or
consumers.
Differences in turnover imply different levels of investment in
male and female workers, and lesser hiring of women than men. Combining















<m in equilibrium,1f <hm






.Clearly, qf if and only if Pf m• ForPf <Pm'and for 0 <a<213
optimal qf
The model formulated in Section I is in terms of a single firm demand-
ing a single kind of skill, q. Expression (15) shows that within a given
occupation women will undergo less firm specific training than men. An
additional interpretation of this result exists. If levels of investment
q, are positively correlated with occupational classification, smaller
optimal investment in women may imply occupational segregation within the
firm as well, i.e., it may be optiaal for employers to hire and train
females in the lower skill occupations, and to make more efficient use of
males by training them in the high skill occupations within the firm.
The parameter a is the elasticity of the "effectiveness" of labor
with respect to training. If a is equal to 1.0, the employer is indif-
ferent between human capital and bodies: oneperson with two units of
training is equally as productive as two persons with one unit of train-
ing each. As a increases, human capital becomes more heavily weighted
in the production function. By differentiating the first order condi-




l3o << 2is required because of the assumption thatthecost curve
of investment per worker is quadratic in investment. With constant returns
to scale, a .?2would imply marginal revenue from investment rising at least
as fast as marginal cost. Quantity invested would be indefinite in the case
of a =2,and infinite in the case of a >2.a0 implies qf —q 0, since
marginal revenue would be 0, and therefore everywhere below marginal cost.
14
See Appendix A—I for demonstration of these results.if p <pin equilibrium. As human capital becomes more important
in production, women will receive proportionately less human capital S
investment than men. Women in the higher skill occupations would have
less training relative to their male counterparts than women in the
low skill occupations. Similarly, we expect the relative number of
women to men demanded will be lower in the higher skilloccupations)5
dIf11m <0. (17)
If dçImdci
If we consider an increase in the importance of specific training
for the economy over time, then expressions (16) and (17) can be inter-
preted to state that the relative skills of women in the economy as a
whole would fall over time, and their occupational distribution would
deteriorate, given no change in their labor force behavior.
A shift in demand for investment in human capital by firms away
from women andtoward men also implies shifts in the relative wages
of women. For an increase in czalthough each firm does not desire to
increase wages for either males or females, as all fjrms attempt to
increase the hiring and training of workers. c1ely, since the shift
in demand is proportionately greater for men than women, the relative
wage of women will fall (disregarding supply elasticities).
Similarly, the greater relative net profitability of men than
women in high skill occupations at a moment in time implies the relative
wage of women across occupations should be inversely related to the
skill level. This model does not explicitly consider the possibility
of female selection toward occupations on the basis of their ownlabor
15
See Appendix A—i. This implication can he proved only under
certain assumptions.force characteristics, I.e., lower labor force turnover of women In high
investment occupations, because of the higher expected cost to them of
depreciation on self—financed human capital from leaving the firm or labor
force. To the extent that specific investment and general investment are
correlated across occupations, we iiight expect such a pattern of occupa-
tional selection to exist. This phenomenon would offset somewhat the
prediction of lower relative wages for women in occupations with higher
specific training requirements.
The model as developed in Section I of this chapter is a partial
equilibrium model. It is a model of how firms react to differences in
turnover and different levels of specific human capital investment. One
implication of this model is that wage differentials between firms and be-
tween occupations may exist within sex eategories as well as across them.
In order for the market to tolerate such differentials in equilibrium, an
additional constraint must be imposed that within sex categories, train-
ing period wages are such that the rate of return to the worker from his













R and R are the rates of return to investment for:rnen and women,
in f
respectively. It is not necessary that R equal Rf.III. A Simulation of the Model
The magnitude of the effect of training and turnover on relative
wages can be determined empirically. For purposes of illustration, It
is interesting to simulate themodel,making assumptions about the para-
meters and solving sequentially for qf, q, Wf Wm I and
Economic theory tells us that and y are the shadow prices of Pf
and m' respectively, and that they can be explicitly determined
—(l)2(1pqa —Wf)If (16)
(1p)2(kMP —Wm)Im
For simplicity, assume that = — — n forboth
males and females, and let a =0.Solving the first order equilibrium
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_________ kMPqf —°f 2—a(l+ri) •kMP ,a —4of





—2—a(+)__________—Worn 2—açl+nkMP — l+n
4c.r(l_prn)2c4cr(l+) 'rn br 2c
Ignoring training period wages,
1
qf 2—a










These relationships are plotted on log—log paper in Figures Ia, Ib, and
Ic. A very strong positive association betweena and Pf/1in the market
place could lead to a positive association between
qf/q, Wf/W and
If/Tm and a, although the partial effect of a on all these variables




LI]IV.Implications of Ceneral Human Capital Investment
It is interesting at this point to contrast the implications of
general human capital investment for relative wage and ouantitv of
training of females with those derived from the specific human capital
model. Selection by low turnover females to occupations involving
larger quantities of self—financed, or general, human capital implies
a higher relative quantity of training in these occupations than in
lower investment occupations. Let its employ the Ben—Porath16 model in
an extremely simplified form. Market wage is equal to a rental once,
a, per unit of general human capital multiplied by the number of units
of general human capital, H. If ie assume that women are employed in







P is the proportion of time spent in the market in any given period,
assumed for simplicity to be the same for all periods, W is the market
wage, equal to aHf and Wh is the home wage. No depreciation of market
skills is associated with spending less than full time in the market.
If males are assumed to spend full time in the market, because of zero
home productivity, then the return to investment for males can be expressed
as
J =(1/1+r)tall . (20)
in gin
The marginal revenue of investment in general human capital for males is
=aE(1/l+r)t=a/r . (21)
Ben—Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and tue Life Cycle
of Earnings,' Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 7, August, 1967.30
marginalrevenue curve of investment for males is just equal to the
discounted present value oila,the rental price ofaunit ofgeneralhuman
capital.
Achange in 11g implies a change in the wage rate: Wall, If the
proportionof time women allocate tomarket work is responsive to the wage
rate,thenmarginalrevenue of investment ingeneralhumancapital for
Womenis
MRf =a(l/l+r)t+ (ll -
Wh) a/r(J) + (allgf -
W11)).(22)
ilRf.marginal revenue curve of investment for females isequal to the dis-
counted present value of the change in wage modified by the proportion of
time spent in the market plus the value of increased time in themarket
less the loss in home product. Since men are assumed toalways be in the
market full time, no increase.jn participation is associated withan in-
crease in wage. The marginal revenue curves for males and females are
illustrated in Figure II. We assume men and women to be equally able in





Figure2If a zero correlation between home wage and proportion of time
spent in the market is postulated a riori, positive correlation between
proportion of time spent in the market and general investment undertaken
arises from two different sources: higher marginal revenue curves for
women who expect ex ante to be in the market a larger proportion of their
lifetime, and the responsiveness of labor force participation to higher
wage rates.The women who do anticipate spending more time in the imrket
will select higher investment occupations. In addition, those women in
higher investment occupations will spend more time in the market because
of their higher wages. The net result is that these women have more
masculine labor market characteristics, i.e., Pf/P is higher, implying
greater relative quantity of training and therefore a higher relative wage.
A change in the rental price per unit of general human capital, caused
by increased demand for skilled labor, will shift the marginal revenue






Themarginal revenue curve for females is found to have a greater propor-
tional upward shift than that for males, leading to a greater proportional
increase in female investment relative to male investment, and therefore to
a higher relative wage.
The implications of general training across occupations andover time
are different from those generated by the specific human capital model. The
women found in occupations requiring a greater volume of general investment
will be more umasculine in their characteristics, i.e., willexpect tospend a larger proportion of their time in the market and will invest more
in themselves relative to men than women with higher expected turnover.
The higher relative quantity of investment undertaken implies a higher
relative wage as well. Therefore, the relative wage and relative quantity
of general investment will vary directly with the volume of general invest-
ment across occupations. It will be helpful to keep in mind the distinctly
different implications of general and specific human capital investment for
relative wage of women when interpreting the results of the empirical test-
ing of the specific human capital model.
.V. SummaryofImplications_of the Specific Human Capital Model
1. The joint existence of employer fnanced training and sex
differences in turnover Is sufficient to produce wafle differen-
tials between men and women in the absence of any taste F or
discrimination.
2.The quantity of firm specific investment in women relative to men
will vary inversely with the volume of specific human canital
across occunations, holding constant the relative turnover rates
of men and women.
3.The relative wage of women and proportion hired will vary inversely
with the volume of specific human canital across occupations,
holdin constant the relative turnover rates of men and women.
4.As the labor force characteristics of women approach those of men
across occupations and over time, their relative wage, skill, and
occupational distribution will imnrove.34
CHAPTER 3
Empirical Formulation and Testing of Implications of the
Specific Htnnan Capital Model for Relative Wage
and Occupational Distribution of Women
I. Problems of Empirical Formulation
The theoretical model developed in Section I, Chapter 2, suggests
that the appropriate unit of observation in the empirical formulation
of the model would be the firm, since the term "specific training" im-
plies training specific to the firm. However, detailed firm data com-
pensation by sex are impossible to obtain. In addition, firms do not
provide training in only one skill, but employ and train workers in a
range of jobs. Carl N.Rahm17 argues that the natural embodiment of
skill is the occupation; a basic hypothesis of his work is that occu-
pational earnings reflect different investment levels. For the purpose
of testing the model presented in Chapter 2 of this paper, occupation
is the unit of analysis available from the data which best represents
a homogeneous range of skills. Aggregate occupational data represents
the "average" firm which produces the bundle of skills requisite for
that occupation. In Chapter 2, the behavior of firms predicted by the
model was aggregated to market predictions. Using aggregate occupa-
tional data for empirical estimation tests the validity of the firm
model against the behavior of the market.
Additional problems of formulation arise from limitations of data.
No measure of the volume of on—the—job training acquired by individual
workers exists. Even continuous labor force experience cannot be ex—
actly measured from available bodies of data. Continuoustime since
17Carl M. Rahm, "Investment in Training and the Occupational Structure
of Earnings," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1971).completion of schooling, "exposure" to the labor market, is the estimate
of labor force experience generally used. For primeage males whose high
labor force attachment leads to almost continuous participation over the
life cycle, this definition of experience has proved to be satisfactory.
However, for females, whose participation is intermittent over the life
cycle, exposure diverges widely from true labor force experience. Since
market experience has been shown in the human capital literature to hea
strong determinant of wages, the lack of a direct measure18 presents a
severe problem for the explanation of female wages. One means of adjust-
ment to this problem is to include the number of children horn to the
average woman in an occupation as a proxy variable for average years out
of the labor force.
Another problem for analysis of the wage differential between males
and females is the lack of information on turnover rates by occupation
and sex. From data on average job tenure by occupation andsex, we could
make rough estimates of turnover rates. Such data has been published for
major occupation groups by the Bureau of the Census for 1951, and by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for theyears 1963, 1966, and 1968, and are
presented in Table 1. Simple assumptions described in the footnote to
that table translate the -job tenure data into expected attrition data
presented in Table 2.
The implications of the model with respect to training refer parti-
cularly to specific training. It is crucial to the analysis to properly
18Mincer andPolachek, Ibid, find that when they use the segmented
work histories of women available in the NationalLongitudinal Survey of
Work Exper1e of Women, 30—44, theexplanatory power of the earnings
function for women is greatly increased, and that children do not add any
information to the equation.36
define a variable corresponding to such on—the—lob training. From the
human capital literature, we know the effects of on—the—lob training on
the experience—earnings profile of individuals. Greater post—school in-
vestments in human capital imply steeper dollar earnings profiles with
peaks later in the life cycle than do smaller quantities of training.19
Fuchs used a measure of steepness of the experience—earnings profile
as an indication of training in his paper on male—female differentials in
hourly earnings.20 However, the steepness of the profile basically re-
flects general training. In order to use such a measure for our analysis,
we must make the assumption that general and specific training are positively
correlated across occupations. This assumption does not seem unreasonable
in view of the positive correlation between schooling and post—school in-
vestment (in dollar terms) across individuals.2' Individuals with higher
education also undertake greater post—school investment; assume this cor-
relation is positive with respect to both general and specific invest-
ment. Then occupations in which workers of higher educational quality
are employed must involve more of both forms of training, and we should
observe a positive correlation between the dollar quantities of general
and post—school investment across occupations. There are two additional
problems with working with the experience—earnings profile in this con-
text. One is that simply because of the smaller average experience of
women than men, in occupations involving higher returns to experience,
19Jacoh Mincer "Schooling, Experience, and Earning, (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974).
Fuchs, Ibid.
2l Mincer, Ibid.women will earn less than men. This effect will be somewhat counteracted
by the positive selection of women on the basis of their own labor force
characteristics to occupations involving self—financed human capital in-
vestment. The second problem arises from the fact that one is not observ-
ing the same individuals in cross section. Certain occupations may be
"stepping—stone" occupations, in which the payoff to early investment does
not come from within the occupation, hut from graduating to another, better
paying occupation. The individuals observed in the higher experience
classes of these occupations are the "losers", the ones who remained in
the occupations rather than graduating, and therefore received little pay—
of f to their earlier investment. However, this problem is of little im-
portance for demand considerations.II. Empirical Results for the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity
The 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity is a survey of household
units conducted by the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1967 which is
comprised of a national probability sample and a supplementary sample
of low income, primarily nonwhite households. One benefit of the supple-
mentary sample is that it provides data for blacks in sufficient quantity
to permit running regressions for blacks and whites separately. Because
of the higher observed relative wage and stronger labor force attachment
of black women compared to white women, we would expect, a priori, quite
different empirical results for the two groups.
Regressions for the white and nonwhite samples are estimated separately
on data for employed civilian males and females with positive hourly earn-
ings, not currently enrolled in school. The data were grouped separately
by sex and race, and aggregated within detailed occupation groups.
The 1967 SEO estimates hourly earnings of resnondents by dividing
weekly earnings during the survey week from all gainful activity by total
hours worked during the week. In individual data subsequently grouped by
primary occupation, this procedure of estimation introduces error into the
estimate of hourly wage rate associated with an occupation. In addition,
random variations in hours worked by individuals during the survey week
may cause an over— or Understatement of the hourly wage of wage and salary
workers.
The large variance in the number of males and females across occupa-
tions suggests using weighted regressions. All regressions presented are
weighted by the square root of the number in the occupation.
.TABLE 7
Average Job Tenure by Sex and Race for
the Years 1951, 1963, 1966, and 1968
Median Years on Same Job
Male Year Female
White: 4.0 1951* 2.3
Nonwhite: 3.1 1.7




White: 5.0 1968d 2.4
Nonwhite: 3.3 2.0
Source: See Table 14U
Followingthe experience—earnings model developed by Jacob Mincer,
I have employed the log of wage as the dependent variable in the follow-
ing equations. Although the demand model developed in this paper does
not mandate this specification, empirically we will he estimating a re-
duced form rather than pure demand equation, and the literature (Mincer,
Rahn, Polachek) suggests that the proper reduced form specification is
log—linear.
The experience and earnings variable included in the male and
female regressions serve a dual purpose: they provide estimates of
the rate of return across occupations, and, in addition, hold constant
quality of male and female workers. Becauee of the discontinuous nature
of labor force participation by women, the average number of children is
included in the female equation in order to modify female expetience.
The simplest assumption to make about the effect of children on experi-
ence is to interpret true experience to be equal to observed experience
minus c years per child times the number of children. Consider the post—
school investment model of earnings.22
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—logE+ rEk + log(l—k1) S (25)
Assume k, time equivalent investment, to be a linear declining function
of experience, illustrated in Figure 3
ka_bt . (26)
During the period out of the labor force for women with children, assume
that no investment takes place. Then the investment profile for women
with children would be as in Figure 4. The existence of the profile
below the horizontal axis indicates that depreciation or disinvestment




tThe dotted line represents the investment profile in the absence
of children. The distance between points t1 and t2 is equal to
where is the number of years out of the market for each child, and C




f(a—bt)dt—I Sdt+ f(a—bt)dt .(27)
0
t1
The second integral term represents possible depreciation of skills.
If we let t1t0 —C/2and t2t0 + 6C/2, then
at —b/2t2—(a-ht0+ )C . (28)
This specification implies that the children variable should be entered
into the log linear equation in arithmetic form.
In addition to serving as a proxy for length of time spent out of
the labor force, the average number of children variable may also serve
as a proxy for the number of "trips" in and out of the labor force women
have made on average. Inter—labor force turnover is a key variable for
explaining the effects of human capital on female wages. Although no
direct measure of such turnover exists in the data, there are several
proxy variables which can be constructed from the Survey of Economic
Opportunity. Onesuchmeasure is the variance of weeks worked in 1966
by men and women in each occupation (FVAR, MVAR); large variance would
indicate greater inter—labor force mobility. We would expect such mo-
bility to be more costly for men than; for women because of the greater
investment in general human capital by men than women. Another turn-
over proxy provided by the SEO is the proportion of those who have left
the logest job they held in 1966 (FTR1, MTR1). This variable captureboth the inter— and intra—lahor force mobility of men and women. Be-
cause voluntary intra—lahor force mobility is a form of investment in
human capital, i.e., lob mobility induced by better opportunities, we
would expect to find this mobility less costly to men than women, for
whom such mobility might have a larger exogenous component. A third
variable, the percent of males and females who worked full time hours
when they worked in 1966, (FTF,FTM), is a measure of previous labor
force attachment. Log of hours worked during the survey week (LF}TRS,
LMHRS) serves the dual purpose of controlling for random fluctuations
in hours and of acting as a measure of present labor force attachment.
FSO,MSO, variables which attempt to standardize for regional dis-
persion of the Individuals In the sample are also included in the re-
gression equations.
The variable measuring the volume of investment associated with an
occupation (DWAGE) is constructed from the experience—wage profile of
white males within the occupations. DWAGE is the difference in average
hourly wage between white males with 10—20 years of experience and white
males with 0—10 years of experience. Most investment takes place during
the early years of labor force experience. DWAGE measures the difference
between the early training wage when investment Is being fittanced and the
later wage which Includes some return to investment.
Regressions are run separately by sex and race; the dependent variable
is the log of average hourly wages of males and females for each occupation
(LFWAGE,LNWAGE). Table 8 summarizes the variables used in the regressions
and their definitions. All regressions are weighted by the square root
of cell size.Table 8
Variables Appearing in Regressions
Variable Name Variabie Definition
LNWAGE,LFWAGE Log of the average wage of males and females,
respectively, for the occupation.
MSCHL,FSCHL Average number of rears of schooling completed
by men and women in the occunation
XP,FEXP Average number of years sd.nce completion of formal
schooling by men and women, respectively, in the
occupation.
LMHRS,LFHRS Log of average hours worked by men and women in
the occunation during the week prior to inter-
view.
vrM,FrF Percent of males and females in the occupation who
worked full time (i.e., 35 hours or more per
week) when employed in 1966.
MTl,FTRl Percent of men and women in the occupation who
reported having left the longest lob of 1966.
MVAR,FVAR Variance in weeks worked in 1966 by men and women
in the occupation.
KIDS The average number of children born to the women
in an occupation
DWAGE The difference in average hourly wage between
white males who have 10—20 years of experience
and those who have 0—10 years of experience.
XXM ,XXF MVAR*DWAGE,FVAR*D WAGE
XYM,XYF MrR1*DWAGE, VI'Ri*DWAGE
LMNIJN,LFNUM Log of the number of men and women in each occupa-
tion, respectively.
.A. Empirical Results for White Males and Females: Wages
The average wages of males and females within occunations are not in-
dependently determined; whatever market forces affect the demand for male
labor also affect the demand for female labor in an occunation or industry.
The model developed in this paper suggests how such effects may differ for
men and women across occupations. Because of the simultaneous determina-
tion of wages for males and females within occupations, the method of joint
generalized least squares estimation of seemingly unrelated equations,
developed by Zellner22, is employed to estimate the log wage equations for
males and females. This method is designed to estimate jointly a combina-
tion of equations which appear to be unrelated, hut are in fact related
because their residual disturbance terms are correlated. Theoretically,
such estimation results in more efficient estimates. The joint (LSre—
suits are presented in Tables 9 and 10. ()LS results are included in the
appendix. Surprisingly, the empirical correlation between the residuals
of the male and female equations is quite small, although stat{sticallv
significant. Therefore, the results of the two estimation procedures
do not differ much.
TURNOVER
Thefirst equations of Tables 9 and 10 do not include the traininR
proxy or its interaction terms. The turnover variables all behave in
the expected manner in the male and female equations, excent for the
log of hours variable (LFI-TRS,LMTIRS) which has an unexnected negative
Zeliner, "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias." Journalofthe American
Statistical Association, 57, 1962, pp. 348—368
For an expositionofthis technfaue, seeTheil,Princinles of









FSCHL .97700—01 .93460—ni .90730.-ni .92860—ni .9014n—01.
(11.31) (10.23) (1.792) (10.08) (9.648)
FEXP .3116D—02 .20220—02 —.8503D—02 .10200—02 —.9658p—02
(.1538) (.9958D—0l(.3939) (49510-01) (.4421)
PEXP2 .40660-04 .6927D—04 .25460—03 .8230D—04 .27570—03
(.9269D—01)(.1466) (.5524) (.1859) (.5985)
LFHRS —1.191 —1.251 —1.254 —1.244 —1.246
(5.820) (5.887) (5.956) (5.831) (5.898)
FTF 1.091 1.124 1.101 1.120 1.096
(6.892) (7.058) (6.933) (7.003) (6.877)
FSO —.22400—02 —.24700—02 —.25160—02 —.2508D—02 —.2541D—02
(1.709) (1.881) (1.933) (1.907) (1.949)
F'rRi —. 3581D-02 —. 3844D-02 —. 2803j)—02 —.40210—02 296ly-O2
(1.668) (1.781) (1.234) (1.822) (1.277)
FVAR 0.2477D—03 —.28010—03 —. 32210—03 —.1471D-03 —.2041D—03
(.4503) (.5115) (.5924) (.2007) (.2810)
KIDS —.40500-010.43010-01 —. 32540—01 —.43180-01 —.32670-01.
(1.089) (1.162) (.8671) (1.163) (.8686)
DWAGE .24480-03 .54010-03 . 35750—03 . 6401D-03
(1.309) (1.893) (.7255) (1.208)
XXF —.11270-05 —. 10070—05
(.2547) (.2295)
XYF —. 20730—04 0.2077D—04
CONSTANT
(1.359) (1.362)
3.125 3.377 5.548 3.365 3.537
(4.633) (4.884) (4.884) 4.656 4.863Table 10
Dependent Variable: LMWAGE
Joint (LS Estimates
1 2 3 4 5
(7. 330) (7. 307)
.9406 0—01 .9532 0—Ol .9500 0—01
(7.406) (7.383)










MSO —.1114 0—02—.7106 0—03
(.6122) (.4224)
HTR1 —.8081 0—04 .5216 0—03
(.2752 D—0l) (.1919)









































































coefficientin all equations. This phenomenon can he partially explained
by the construction of the dependent variable. Hourly wage is constructed
by the SEO by dividing weekly earnings by weekly hours. The interviewers
did attemptto get a "permanent"measure of wage iwexcludingovertime hours
and pay. This effort would reduce any expected positfve correlation between
hourly wage and hours worked. However, it is clear that there may still ex-
ist a negative correlation between hours and wage; individuals may receive
weekly or monthly salaries which are independent of any random fluctuations
in hours worked during the week irior to interview. Therefore, the bench-
mark value for testing the effect of hours worked on hourly wage should he
one rather than zero. In none of the male or female equations is the co-
efficient of log hours significantly different from unity in absolute value.
Interpreting log of hours as a turnover variable leads us to conclude that
it has no significant effect on wage. Hours worked during a specific week
is simply an observation at a point in time; wages, however, depend on long—
run patterns of turnover behavior. Therefore the statistical insignificance
of this variable is not surprising.
The three other turnover variables employed in the equations involve
more than an observation at a point in time; they all capture turnover be-
havior in 1966, the year preceding the survey. Interestingly, the coef-
ficients of these three turnover variables differ between the male and fe-
male equations in a pattern consistent with the exnected underlying dif-
ferences in investment in human capital. While the effect of having left
the longest job of 1966 is insignificantly different from zero in all the
male equations, it is consistently negative and significant at at least
a 10¼ level of confidence in three of the five female equations. It is
insignificant only when its interaction with training is also included
in the equation. Intra—lahor force mobility may he interpreted as a formof human capital investment for men, who presumablychange lobs in order
to exploit better onportunitieg. Such mobility offersa smaller payoff
to women than men, because of their own shorter expected duration oflobs.
Therefore, we would expect a greater proportion of women than men who
have changed jobs to have done so forexogeneous reasons. Hence the
stronger decrease in earnings associated with changing lobs in the female
equations. Of course, some proportion of males who changed lobsmay also
have done so because they were fired or exneriencedsome unemployment in
1966. For males, exogenous lob mobility is better canturedby the variance
in weeks worked during 1966. The negative effect of this turnovervariable
is significant in all the male equationg, although the coefficient merely
borders on significance when the interaction of 4VAP with DWA(E is inclu-
ded in the equation. Because of the high labor forceparticipation of
white males, the variance in weeks is quite probablya measure of involun-
tary turnover. For females, the variance in weeks worked during 1966 would
represent exogenous mobility to a lesser extent; periods of no work in the
market do not necessarily represent periods of unemployment forwomen, hut
of alternative employment in the home. Women may selectoccupations in
which intermittent participation is not costly in terms ofwage reduction,
in which skills do not depreciate during periods out of the laborforce,
or in which the loss in terms of foregone investment is small. Therefore
we expect and find a small, insignificant effect of variance of weeks worked
on female wage.
The percent of males and females iho worked full time hours when they
worked in 1966 (FTF,MTN) is a measure of past attachment to the labor force.
Although positive and significant for both males and females, the effect of
previous attachment on present wage is almost twiceaslarge for males.
This difference is consistent ith the hypothesis that men both invest50
more in themselves and have more invested in them by employers than
women, as is predicted by the model. The stronger the previous attach-
ment, as measured by FTM and inversely by MVAR,thegreater the previous
stock of human capital. We expect such a positive effect to be smaller
for females than males because they invest less in themselves and have
less invested in them by firms during emnloyment. While greaterpast
attachment implies greater stock of capital for women as well asmen, the
implicit addition to stock is nonetheless smaller for women than that made
by men. If we were to accept the ratio of the female to male coefficients
as the ratio of their total average stocks of human capital, both snecific
and general, the total human capital investment of women relative to men
would be about 50%.
TRAINING
The coefficients on the interaction terms between training and turn-
over are all negative, as expected, although insignificant for both males
and females. The partial effect of training on wage cannot he read from
the coefficient of DWAGE along, since interaction terms are present. Table
11 presents the effect of PWAGFon log of maleand female wage when the
Uthbr variables are evaluated at the mean. A difference of $.Olper
1Pryear in the slope of the earning profile, equivalent to $20.00
per year in annualearnings, at 2000full time hours per year,
difference of approximately .877% inmalewages and .2448% in
Jethtewakes,or a difference in relative wage of about .6322%. A dif—
ferteo $.lOper hour per year between twooccunations, equivalent to
peryear per year in the experience enrnings slope, imnlies a dif—
in relative wage of 6.3% between the twooccimations.
Theeffectgof trainin andturnover on relative wage at the mean is
1tiTable 12. 1etween 13.3 nd 30.21 nercentage noints of themean relative wage can he explained by the joint existence of sex dif-
ferences in turnover rates and training, dependingon whether the maleor
female values of the turnover variables are used. Measured interms of
the relative wage differential, 29.49% at themean, the combined effect
of training and turnover explains between 45.10% and 102.44% ofthe dif-
ferential, depending on whether the male or female turnover valuesare
employed in the calculations. Of course, levels of turnover and theco-
efficients on turnover are not unrelated in these equations. when the
female values of turnover are employed in the male equation, thenre—
dicted relative wage results in the higher estimate of thejoint effect
of training and turnover. This result is due to the Fact that themale
eauation reflects the greater human capital investment undertaken by
men, and therefore the greater cost to them of a given change in turn-
over. Tn fact, as the labor force behavior of women approached that of
men over time, presumably the coefficients in the femalewage equation
would approach those of the male equation. Therefore, thecross—section
estimate of the joint effect of training and turnover, when using the
male values and the female regression coefficients isan underestimate.
Both the estimates are, of course, point estimates, withno associated
confidence intervals. Nevertheless, they are quite large, at theex-
treme explaining the entire wage differential, suggesting the empirical
importance of training and turnover for the relativewage of females.
The measured effect of training and turnover on relativewage of
females within occupations cannot he ascribed entirely to specific
human capital alone. Polachek has demonstrateI theimportance of dif—
ferentlal labor force behavior for investment in general human canital
and its consequences for the relative earnings of women. However, the
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Calculatfonsare based on regression equations 2 of Tables 9 and 10.by meanand women may he captured in occupational selection itself.
Clearly, there is variation in the amount of general training acouired
by individuals within occupations; however, by investigating the rela-
tive wage within occupations, we are holding general investment constant
to some extent.
In chapter 2, the implications of pure general training for the
relative wage were contrasted with those of specii.i.c training. Those
women who enter occupations involving large amounts of self—financed in-
vestment should have labor market characteristics more similar to those
of men than women on average; hence, their investment relative to men in
those occupations would he larger than for women on average. In addition,
their stronger labor force attachment would ead them to suffer less de-
preciation of their human capital from intermittent periods out of the
labor force. Therefore, the eouations in which the interactive effect
of training and turnover were not included would he expected to predict
a nositive effect of training on relative wage of women, on the basis of
general human capital alone, since only more "masculine" women would he
found in these occupations. However, the economic effect of DWAGE on
relative wage in these equations is negative, and statistically signifi—
cáttt Rs predicted by the specific human canital hynothesis. Therefore,
1thoph we cannot measure the senarate effects of general and specific
training on relative wage in these eauations, the negative effect of DWAGE
on relative wage supports interpreting the slope coefficient as capturing
the effect of the specific component of training on relative wage.
Marital Status and Children
In none of the equations for log of female wage is marital status of
women included as an independent variable. The rationale for including
marital status of women in a female earnings function is as a proxyvariable for labor force attachment and turnover. However, earlyexperi-
mentation with the percent of women never married as an additional in-
dependent variable resulted in an unexpected negative coefficient which
wasnever significant. The simple correlation between percent never
married and the other turnover variables was quite high, so that marital
status added no information on expected turnover to the equation. In addi-
tion, the other proxy variables for turnover and labor force attachment
were more straightforward and empirically more powerful than marital sta-
tus. Therefore, it was omitted in the final equations.
Essentially the same factor can exnlain the consistently insinifi—
cant coefficient of the average number of children variable. The direct
information provided by the turnover proxies contain the information other-
wise provided by KIDS. Although, statistically insignificant in all equa-
tions, the coefficient of KIDS suggests that each additional child imnlies
about a 4% reduction in female wage.
Discrimination
Differential labor force behavior of males and females has implica-
tions for relative wages apart from those that work through specific
human capital investment. In that most women work in the home as well
as the market, they may select occupations which offer lower wages in ex-
change for more flexible hours; the variance in average female hours rela-
tive to the mean was .996 against .373 for males in the sample. They may
choose occupations which offer easier exit and entry, so that intermittent
periods of withdrawal from the labor force incur minimal loss in wages. In
addition, part of the differential may he due to dIscrimination against
women by employers or consumers. Tf men and women were identical in all
respects——in their work, in home nroduction, in their labor force behavior——
the only variables affecting their relative wage would he years of schoolingand years of experience. since men and women are not identical, however,
we expect and find the coefficients on experience to differ between males
and females in the earnings functions we have estimated. One possible in-
dicator of discrimination against women would he a smaller proportionate
increase in earnings per unit of schooling capital for women than men.
Even in the absence of discrimination, women with eotial levels of school-
ing as men might choose lower paving occupations for the reasons mentioned
above; this factor is accounted for in the eiuations of Table 9 and 10,
because the observations are occupational averages. In addition, a unit
of schooling capital may not he the same to men and women in terms of its
market directed content. In none of the equations presented in Table 9
and 10 are the coefficients on schooling significantly different between
the male and female equations. T—values for these differences average
about .25. This evidence directly contradicts the common allegation of
increasing discrimination at higher education levels. Widening earnings
differentials between men and women with increasing education, to the
extent that they exist, must be attributed solely to differences in post-
school investment.
B. Regression Results: The Occupational Distribution
The model developed in Chapter 2 implies that wages, turnover, and
quantity of training are optimally decided independently of the number
t$iilsandfemales hired. Given these optimal values, the proportion
ö males and females hired is determined by relative turnover rates, by
,theimportance of training in production, and by the relative cost
of hiring them, specifically search costs. We have no a priori notion
of relative costs of searching for male and female labor; in the model
€kese tosts were assumed to rise at the same rate in both pools. For
theempiricalanalysis, turnover rates and the volume of investmentassociated with an occupation are the relevant variables affecting the
desired number of males and females.
Demand aalvsis leads us to expect a strong negative relationshin
between turnover and relative number of females employed, as well as be-
tween volume of specific investment and relative number of women in an
occupation. When we consider the interaction of the supniv of females
to occupations with the demand effect, the relationship between turnover
and relative number may be reversed. Women in high investment occupations,
where there are relatively few women employed, should he more "masculine"
in their labor force characteristics, i.e. have lower labor force turn-
over. This nhenomenon could lead to a nositive correlation between turn-
over and relative number of women.
The partial effect of training, holding costant turnover, is also not
unambiguous in the occupational distribution equations. To the extent that
optimal wage differentials compensate firms for fighter losses due to hieher
turnover, the relative number of females to males may he unrelated to train-
ing across occupations. Firms that are fully compensated by differential
wages may determine the relative number of males and females solely on the
basis of relative cost of hiring them.
Tables 13 and 14 Present the joint GLS estimates for the occupational
distribution regressions where the wage differential is not included in the
estimating equations. OLS est{ates are nresented in the Appendix.
In the female equations, the turnover variables are of conflicting
sign. FVAR, the variance in weeks worked has a statistically significant,
positive effect In all equations; nresumahlv this variable is capturing
the supply resnonse of women to occupations permitting greater variation
in participation. The coefficient of FVAP in the efficient results im-
plies an elasticity of supply with respect to variation in weeks of about 2.VR1 and KIDS have negative coefficients, indicating that holding constant
supply effects, greater turnover leads to fewer women employed. Although
DWAGE is not significant when entered into the equations alone, its effect
is stronger when entered In conlunction with interaction terms. The nega-
tive interaction terms are in accordance with those found in the wage
equations.
The relative effect of training for males and females, evaluated at
the mean value of the turnover variables, is presented in Table 15. The
effect of training on relative number of females employed is never signi-
ficant and varies in sign depending upon the equation employed. The effect
is negative when the interaction between training and turnover characteris-
tics of women is not held constant, as would he expected. However, one
suspects that tFese equations are mis—specified since they do not control
for the wage differential.
In order to enter the wage differential into the occupational distribu-
tion equations, Two Stage Least Souares estimation procedure was necessary,
since wage and number hired are both endogeneous to the system. In the
first stage, FRAT and MUAT, the log of female and male wage, respectively,
are predicted. The predicted log of relative wage, DIFF, is the difference
between FHAT and MHAT. Tables 16 and 17 present loint GLS results for the
regressions of log of numbers on turnover and training variables alone,
thtethewage differential, DIFF, is held constant in both the male and
female equations. TwoStageLeast Squares results are presented in the
Appendix.
The coefficient on 111FF behaves in the expected manner for both the
male and female equations; it is positive in the former and negative in
the latter. Holding constant T)TFF, the relative wage, an increase in




1 2 3 4 5
FSCHL —.1949 —.2073 —.2092 —.2287 —.2289







































































































1 2 3 4 5
(2.192) (2.564) (2.557) (2.216) (2.199)
NEXP .5440 .5834 .5787 .5673 .5692










































































































* Significantat a .05 level of confidence.on the number employed. At first this may seem surnrising. However,
a higher male wage, holding constant the relative wage and the turnover
characteristics of females, amy fmniy "better auaiitv" males in the
occupation and therefore a lower demand for women. im1.lar1y, a hieher
female wage, holding constant the relative wage of females, may imply
"better", i.e., lower turnover, females, and therefore reduced demand for
men.
When the compensating sex differential in wagesisincluded in the
equations explaining occupational distribution of r'en and women, the effect
of greater training on the relative nimber of women becomes consistently
negative. These calculations are presented in Table 18. The negative
effect becomes quite large when the interactive effect of training and
turnover are not held constant. A $.lO per hour per year difference
between two occupations in the slope of the experience wage profile of
white males in the occupation imolies a difference of 16.3% noints in
the relative number of females employed in the two occunations, if the
interactive effect between training and turnover is not held constant.
C. Summary
The effect of training on relative wage of women and relative num-
ber of women hired, measured in Tables 11 and 18 of this chapter, suggests
the empirical importance of training for the relative position of women
itt thlaborforce, given sex differences in labor force behavior, snecif—
icallv in turnover behavior. In the cross—section of occupations, higher
training leads to reduced relative demand for women, reflected both in







1rF .9575 .9098 1.250 1.187
(1.536) (1.457) (1.954) (1.847)
FTR1 —. 2264D—0i —. 1519D—0i —. 3225D—O1 —. 24891)—Ol
(1.695) (1.069) (2.311) (1.660)
FVAR .8l04D—02 .8438D—02 .l580D—Ol .1505D—0l
(2.382) (2.474) (3.387) (3.186)
KIDS —.3165 —.3210 —.4016 —.3984
(1.781) (1.809) (2.169) (2.145)
DWAGE .1097n—02 .3307D—02 .6373D—02 .7445fl—02
(.9368) (1.934) (2.126) (2.401)
XX!' —. 5218D—04 —. 4500fl—04
(1.979) (1.657)
XYF —. 1590P—03 —. 1334D—03
(1.724) (1.418)
DIFF —1.257 —1.429 —1.563 —1.682
(2.464) (2.758) (2.939) (3.120)
MHAT —1.608 —1.782 —1.883 —2.018
(3.222) (3.513) (3.637) (3.913)
CONSTANT 5.340 5.373 4.797 4.921









(.3534) (.4407) (.6397) (.6686)
MTR1 .1379D—02 .1181n—0i .1935D—02 .6624n—02
(.7111n—o1) (.5637) (.9108n—o1) (.2796)
MVAR —. 3800D—02 —.4417n—02 .5992P—03 .4496n—04
(.6442) (.7431) (.8112n—01) (.5859n—02)
DWAGE .3881D—02 .6341D—02 .5742n—02 .6988D—02
(2.073) (2.569) (2.229) (2.444)






DIFF 1.547 1.609 1.456 1.537
(1.760) (1.818) (1.566) (1.639)
FNAT —2.427 —2.499 —2.255 —2.343
(2.882) (2.946) (2.548) (2.689)
CONSTANT 5.826 5.396 4.098 4.006
(1.524) (1.395) (.9907)
.Source: Tables 16 and 17
Table 18

















III. Regression_Pesultg for Nonwhite Males and Females
Twocharacteristicdifferences exist between white and black females
in the labor force: black women have higher earnings relative to their
male counterparts than white women and also higher labor force participa-
tion rates. Bowen and Finegan found that after adjusting formany factors
such as education, husband's incoute and employment status, and number of
children, there was still a 6.8% average difference in participation rates
between black females and white females.
The snecific human capital model developed in Chapter 2suggests
three factors which could give rise to the observed differences in rela-
tive earnings.
1. The expected lower investment in on—the—job training, both speci-
fic and general, by blacks than whites.
2. The smaller sex differences in turnover for blacks than whites.
From Table 7 we find the average job tenure of black females to
be higher relative to black males than for white females relative
to white males in three of the reported years.
3. The smaller discrepancy between observed and actual experience of
black women than white women, because of their stronger labor force
attachment, inmiving a smaller difference between male and female
exierience than in the white popuiat4,n.
A fourth factor may also he smaller differential discrimination against
black women. This is a point raised by Bowen and Finegan to explain the
remaining differences between the labor force narticipation rates of black
women and white women.
As was expected, the mean value of flWMT, the measure of occupational
investment, is lower in the black samnie than the white, indicating the S
smallerinvestment in training by blacks. The stronger labor forceattachment of black women, however, is not apparent in the SEO sample.
Both the variance in weeks worked in 1966 and the nercent who left the
longest lob of 1966 were higher for black than white women on averaee.
The samnle of blacks in the SEO was substantially drawn hy oversarrnlinp
low income areas. Women, as well as men, in low income areasmay have
low incomes because of histories of intermittent or little particination
in the labor force. In addition, welfare may he a feasible alternative
form of "employment" for lower income blacks, leadinp to a ereaternum-
ber of trips in and out of the market. Because of the nature of this
sample, we expect the model to he less useful in expiainin occupational
wages of nonwhites.
Regressions identical in structure to those estimated on the white
sample were estimated for black males and females, over sixty occunations.
Toint GLS results are presented in Tables 19 and 20; OLS regressionre—
suits are r,resented in the Appendix.
Turnover
We exnect to find turnover a less important factor in exolaining the
wages of black males and females than white because of the smaller invest-
ment in human capital undertaken by blacks than whites. Tn fact, we find
the coefficients on both FTR1, FVAR and MTR1, MVAR to be similar to those
in the white female equation. The selection of occunations for the samle
is constrained by the requirement of finding both men andwomen in the
occupation. Because of the occupational concentration ofwomen, the
sample is biased toward "feminine" occupations. The constraint was more
limiting in the case of blacks than whites, restricting the black samnle
to only 60 occupations. The "feminine" bias of theoccunations, there-
fore, may he responsible for the close similarity of both the black male





1 2 3 4 5
SCHL .1350 .1426 .1522 .1408 .1668
(13.29) (1.2.95) (12.33) (12.76) (14.14)























I'F .6829 .6848 .7642 .6780 .9196
(4.355) (4.452) (4.819)
. (4.442) (6.184)
FSo —. 4352D—02 —. 4356D—02 —. 4466D—02 —. 4191D—02—. 4028P—02
(5.028) (5.129) (5.340) (4.893) (5.268)
FTR1 —.29061)—02 —.2682D—02 —.2831D—02 —.2938D—02—.4275fl—02
(1.766) (1.654) (1.. 781) (1.807) (2.869)
F\TAR .2214D—04 .6394D—02 .1313D—03 .2514D—03.1265P—02
(.5182D—01) (.1519) (.3149) (.5594) (2.693)
KIDS —. 3214D—01 —. 28321)—Oh 0.25311)—Oh —.3031D—01—.27041)—Oh
(1.103) (.9872) (.8977) (1.064) (1.064)
DWME —.3756D—03 —.8463fl—03 .1858D—03 .6694D—03
(1.645) (2.284) (.3262) (1.285)





1.966 2.016 2.092 2.687




1 2 3 4
. . 9054P—0l . 8760P—0l . 9149D—0l. . 8883n—01
(6.720) (7.025) (7.047) (6.955) (6.980)
MEXT .2371n—0l .1818n—01 .2465n—0i .183fln—Ol .2741P—01
(.7252) (.5643) (.7932) (.5691) (.8867)
MEXP2 —.1384D—03 .3732D—04 —.9339fl—04 .3454n—04 -.1456D—03
(.1977) (.5368n—ol) (.1394) (.4979fl—0l) (.2185)
LMHRS —1.717 —1.569 —1.407 —1.562 -1.374
(5.042) (4.522) (4.132) (4.503) (4.049)
FTM 3.262 3.221 3.332 3.258 3.309
(6.972) (7.027) (7.523) (6.930) (7.245)
!S0 —. 349in—02 —. 3519n—02 —. 3063P—02 —. 3376n—02 —. 3043fl—02
(2.158) (2.221) (1.997) (2.077) (1.947)
MTR1 —.406lfl—02 —.4289p—02 —.1373fl—02 —.4385n—02 —.1291n—02
(1.399) (1.507) (.4521) (1.530) (.4186)
MVAR .1051D—02 .1l72D—02 .8504fl—03 .1297T)—02 .9184n—03
(1.380) (1.555) (1.157) (1.544). (1.11.1)
DWACE —.6661fl--03 .9066D—03 —.4787D—03 .8401n—03
(1.632) (1.129) (.6954) (.9326)
XXM —. 3030P—05 .1182D—06
(.3250) (.1305D—01)
XYM —. lllOD—03 —. 1074D—03
(2.264) (2.170)





The nartial effect of training on female and male wage is presented
in Table 21. Higher levels of investment across occupations, as measured
by DWAGE, seem to imply lower wages for both black men and black women.
This result is contrary to the implications of the model and to the results
found for whites. However, blacks comprise a small fraction of the labor
force. The negative effect of PWAGE may, to some extent, canture substitu-
tion effects not between black men and women, hut between blacks as a groun
and whites as a group. Apparently, the fall in demand for blacks relative
to whites, because of higher training, has a stronger effect on black males
than black females, implying a rise in demand for black females relative to
black males.
As was expected, the combined effect of training and turnover explains
a smaller proportion of the relative wage differential for blacks than whites.
Both point estimates of this effect are smaller in Table 22 than the comnara—
ble estimates for whites, presented in Table 12.
Discrimination
In section II of this chapter, the nroportionate increase in earnings
due to education estimated in the regressions did not differ for white
males and females, providing evidence to counter allegations of increas-
ing discrimination with increasing education. in the black sample, however,
the measured proportionate Increase in wage for additional years of schooling
is significantly higher for women than men, perhaps implying reverse sex
discrimination among blacks. More likely, it reflects the sharp difference
in occupational distribution between younger, more educated black women

















































Calculations are based on regression equations 2 of Tables 19and20.
.
SChapter 4
The Specific Human Capital Model:
An Additional Test of Its Implications
for Wages and Occupational flistrihution of Black Men
Relative to White M
Althoughthe specific human capital model developed in Chapter 2 Is
formulated in terms of males and females, it is clear that themodel can
he applied to any two groups who differ tn labor force turnoverbehavior.
In this chapter, we emnlov the model. to explain tho wagesand occupational
distribution of black men relative to white mon. The behaviorof women is
characterized by their unique role in the household. This is nottrue of
black men; nevertheless, they do show higher turnover ratesthan white men
23
and somewhat lower labor force participation rates.
ble 7 of Chapter 3 reveals that differences in job tenure aresmaller
between black and white men than between white men and women.Smaller dif—
ferences in labor force behavior necessarily imply smallerdifferences in
investment behavior, ceteris parihus. Therefore, although weexpect re—
suits in this chapter qualitatively similar to those of chapter 3,the model
should explain a smaller proportion of the race—differentialin wages than
the sex differential.
I. The_Relativg
Regressions were run on the log of wages of black andwhite males,
identical in structure to those run for white males and femalesin Chapter
3. Variable names and definitions are listed in Table 23.Joint GLS
23The Statistical Abstract of the United States,1 2 shows the labor
force participation rates of white males to he 80.47, 79.7%,and 79.2% for
the years 1960, 1970, and 1971 respectively,
compared to 77.4%. 74.7%, and
73.2% for black males. These figures are takenfrom Table 341, Section 8,
and are irnadlusted for the different age
distributions of the two races.74
results are presented in Tables 24 and 25, LS results anpear in the
appendix.
Turnover
The coefficients on the turnover variables in the black and white
male eauations of Tables 24 and 25 behave in the same manner as they did
in the white male—female equations. The coefficient of loeof hours does
not differ significantly from unity in any of the eauations for either
blacks or whites. Log of hours Is a measure at a particular point intime,
the week nrior to the interview. Therefore, Its insignificanceas a turn-
over variable for wages, which reflect long—run patterns of behavior, is
not surprising.
The disnarjty between the coefficients of the percent who left the
longest job of 1966 found in the male—female equations isnotfound in the
euatjons for blacks and whites. An Increase, of one percent in BTR.1 has
an effect on LBWA(E comparable in magnitude and statistical significance
to the effect of a one Percent increase in TR1 on L17JA(E. Although the
negative coefficinets are consistently stronger in the black enuations
than the white equations, the difference is not statistically sienificant.
The significant negative coefficient of TRi is surprising, since it was
not found in the smaller sample of occupations used for the white male—
female equations. Nevertheless, it is not ip'onsistent with interpreting
WTR1andBTR1 as measures of voluntary intra—lahor force mohilit. Chang-
ing jobs may be a means of acquiring more training; individuals move from
jobs with smaller investment opportunities to jobs offering greater in-
vestment possibilities. The immediate effect on wage of entering a new
job may he negative, since the new worker bns entered,a training period
in which he is financing part of the investment through a iqwer wage.
Variance of weeks worked by workers In an occupation reflectsexogenous mobility for males, who have characteristically hih labor
force narticination rates. Althoucxh neatfve and significantinthe
whiteecuations, the effect of variance of weeks worked on log of hiacir
wage is positive and non—significant. The difference in costliness of
exogenous mohilftv for black and white men imnifes different amounts of
investment, consistent with the results found for white males and females.
Also consistent with results of the analysts o wares of white males
and females, is the difference between the coefficients of PTB and FTW.
Thenercent of workers who worke.d full.time hours when they worked in l9E
is a measure of nast attachment to the labor force. Althouc'h nositive
and significant for both blacks and whites, the coefficient of FTB on
LBWAr,E is between .76 and .83 that of FW and LWPAr,E. This difference is
consistent with the hypothesis that because of their lower turnover,
white men both invest more in themselves and have more invested in them
by employers. The stronger the nrevious attachment of either blacks or
whites, as measured by TB and FTW, the greater the stock of nreviouslv
acauired human capital. We find this effect to he smaller for black men
than white men, lust as it was smaller for white women than white men;
the implicit addition to capital stock resulting from stronger nast attach-
ment to the labor force is smaller both for black men and for white women
than for white men. However, because of the smaller difference tn labor
Force behavior between black and white men than between white men and
women, the difference between these coefficients is also smaller for the
black—white samnie than for the male—female sarinie.If je were to accept
the ratio of the black to white coefficients as the ratio of their total
average stock of human capital, both snecific and general, the total human
capital. investment of black men relative to white men would be ahout .8.
This same ratio 'as found to he about .5 for females relative to males.76
.
Table23
Variables Appearing in Reqressions
Variable Name Variable Definition
LBWAGE,LWWAGE Log of the average wage of blacks and white, respectively
for the occupation.
BSCHL, WSCHL Average number of years of schooling completed by blacks
and whites in the occupation.
BEXP, WEXP Average number of years since completion of formal school-
ing for blacks andwhites,respectively, in the occupa-
tion
LBHR.S, LWHRS Logofthe average hours worked by blacks and whites in
the occupation during the week prior to interview.
FTB, FTW Percent of blacks and whites in the occupation who worked
full time (35 hrs. or more per week) when they worked
in 1966.
BTR1, WTR1 Percent of blacks and whites in the occupation who re-
ported that this job was not the same as the lonqest
job they held in 1966, either because they changed
employers or occupations.
BSO, WSQ Percentof blacks andwhitesin an occupation residing in
the South.
BVAR, WVAR Variancein weeks worked in 1966 by blacks and whites in
the occupation.
DWAGE The difference in average hourly wage between white males
who have 10-20 years of experience and those who have
0—10 years of experience.
XXB, XXW BVAR*DWAGE, WVAR*DWAGE.
XYB, XYW BTR1*DWAGE,WTRl*DvThGE.





1 2 3 4 5
BSC}IL .945q0—o1 .91920—01 .92800—01 .89600—01 .fl42D—fl1
(10.52) (9.713) (9.702) (9.381) (Q.35i)
BEXP .2199T)—01 .23270—01 .24160—Ui .2683fl—01 .27540—01
.(1.338) (1.452) (1.480) (1.637) (1.680)
BEXP2 —.21580—03 —.26410—03 —. 26470—03 —. 34520—03 —.35150—03
(.6487) (.7992) (.8015) (1.034) (1.053)
LBF1RS —.9224 —.9235 —.9305 —.9155 —.9158
(5.990) (5.645) (5.442) (5.433) (.5.374)
FTP 1.696 1.680 1.684 1.601 1.604
(7.693) (7.648) (7.672) (7.012) 7.027
BSO —. 32720—02 —. 33120—02 —.32600—02 —. 34260—02 —. 33770—02
(4.007) (4.084) (4.009) (4.216) (4.141)
BTR1 —.44000—02 —.40990—02 —.43270—02 —.39910—02 —.4191.0—02
(3.602) (3.376) (3.438) (3.289) (3.327)
BVAR .30670—03 .28060—03 .28650—03 —.91200—04 —.73110—03
(.7370) (.6731) (.6870) (.1756) (.1438)
OWAGE .25520—03 .13600—03 —.19960—04 —.12210—03





CONSTANT 1.605 1.624 1.628 1.690 1.667
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T5CHL .98710—01 .91500—01, .93120—01 .91360—01 .93550—01




































































































Table 26 presents the effect of DWAGE on log of black and whfte
wage when the turnover varil-'ies are evaluated at the mean. The values
in the third column of Table 26. measuring the affect of training on
relative wage of hacks to whites, are smaller than the comparable viues
for white females and males nresented in Table 11. This result is consis-
tent with the implications of the model, since smaller differences in turn-
over imnly a smaller di ferentinl effect on wages of diferences in trainin
across occunations. A difference of $.lO ner hour ner year in the exoerience—
wage slope implies a difference in relative wage of blacks to whites of about
4%.
The combined effect of training and turnover on relative wage at the
mean is measured in Table 27. Between 7.73 and 10.83 percentage noints
of the mean relative wage can be explained by the joint existence of train-
ing and race differences in turnover rates, dependinp on whether the black
or white values of the turnover variables are used. Tn absolute terms,
training and turnover have a smaller effect on the relative wage of blacks
to whites than on the relative wage of females to males. In terms of the
wage differential, 15.31% at the mean for blacks, training and turnover
jointly exnlain between 50% and 70%. Although pronortionately smaller
than the explanatory effect of training and turnover for the relative
wage differential of females, this is not a small effect. These are again
point estimates with no associated confidence intervals. }1owever, they
attest the empirical importance of training and turnover for relative wage
of blacks.
Discrimination
The uni,ue role of women in the home is a primary factor in the deter-








3 .3760D—0l .7218fl—0l —.3458fl—01
4 .1768fl—0l .5668D—0l —.3900D—0l
5 .2857D—0l .6313D—0l —.3456D—0l
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(RWAGE-RWAGE) X100.0% ((2)/1-RWAGE) X 100.0%
FTB =FTW








Calculations based on regression (2) of Tables 23 and 24.
RWA(E =84.61
(1 —PWArE)=15.39white man, however, no household division of labor exists to provide
behavioral reasons for market differentials. Clearly, racial discriniina—
tion is one factor which may affect the relative wage differential of
black men. One indicator of discrimination against black men would he a
lower proportionate increase in earnings associated with education for
blacks than whites. This is not apparent from the regression results
presented in Tables 24 and 75.Tn none ef these equations is the co-
efficient on education significantly higher for whites than blacks.
Therefore widening earnings differentials between black and white men
with increasing education, to the extent they exist,must he Attn.—
buted to differences in post—school investment. Tn addition, there is
no evidence that blacks compensate for discriminat:fon by being better
educated than their white counterparts; the average education of blacks
is .5 years lower than whites across occupations.
II. TheOc cupatfonal Di stribut ion
The specific human capital model developed in Chapter 2 implies that
relative wages, turnover, and investment are optimally decided independent—
lv of the number of blacks and whites hired. Civen these optimal values,
the proportion of blacks and whites hired would he determined by their
relative turnover rates and by,theimportance of training in production.
We expect to find a negative relationship between volume of specific in-
vestment and relative number of blacks, across occupations. Joint GLS
estimates of the occupational distribution equations are presented in
Tables 28 and 29; OLS estimates appear in the appendix. Independent van'-
ables in the equations are identical to those of'the wage equations. The
turnover and training variables appear to have no effect on black employ—
tnent across occupations in the equations presented in Table 28, with the
exceptionof VAR, which has a positive effect. Presumably the positivecoefficient on BTAR represents self—selection by black men to occupations
in which variation in participation is less costly. In the white e(lua—
tions, both current attachment to the labor force, measured by hours
worked, and nrevious attachment, measured by the nercent who worked full—
time hours in 1966, have a positive and sienificant effect on employment
across occupations. Variance in weeks worked, although insignificant in
its linear form, has a significant necative interactive effect with train—
ing. The economic effect of training on relative number of blacks to
whites across occupations is presented in Table 30.
In equilibrium, optimal wage differentials set by firms compensate
employers for higher losses due to the higher turnover of blacks. Eecause
the occupational distribution equations of Tables 28 and 29 do not control
for the wage differential, we suspect that they are misspectfied. Tn
Tables 31 and 32, loint flLS estimates of an alterrative specification of
the occupational distribution equations are presented. Log of the number
hired is run as a function of training and turnover variables, of T)TFF, the
predicted relative wage, and of BHAT or AT, the predicted log of black
or white wage. Two State Least Squares estimates annear in the appendix.
Including the compensating wage differential in the eouation strength-
ens the effect of training and turnover on the black wage, although only
BTB1 ever approaches statistical significance. The coefficient on DIFF,
the predicted relative wage of blacks is significant as exnected, negative
in the black equation and positive in the white equations. 1-Tolding constant
turnover and training, a one percent increase in relative wage of blacks
across occupations implies an increase in white employment of 2.14% and a
decrease in black employment of 1.5%, or a fall in relative number of
blacks employed of about 3.64%.









BSCFIL —.2775 —.2806 —.2647 —.2710 —.2544
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2 .02379 % .32077 —.29697
3 .05964 .3872 —.3276
4 .01481 .1994 —.1846
5 .05702 .2728 —.2158
Table 30
.
.occunations, calculated from these equations, 1.s presented in Table 33.
M in Table 30, the effect of training isconsistentlynegative. A $.lO
ner hour ner year difference in the slope of the experience—wage nrofile
between twooccupationsimplies a difference in relative nmher of hlac's
emnioved of about 17% between the two occupations, when the interactive
effects of training and turnover are not held constant. This is smaller
than the 27.87 difference found for relative number of women in Table 18.
III. Summary
The empirical results of this chanter show the impact of tra1.nin and
turnover on the relative wage of blacks and relative number employed to he
strong and significant. ecaue of the smaller differences in turnover be-
havior between black and white males than between white males and females,
the joint effect of training and differences in turnover was found to ex-
plain a smaller pronortion of the race differential in wages than the sex
differential. In addition, when the compensating wage differential was in-
cluded in the occupational ditributjon equations, theaverage effect of a
$.lO difference per hour per year between two occupations in the exnerience—
wage profile on the relative number of black men employed was l.93% as corn—
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The dramatic change in labor force activity of women during the
postwar period has brought into sharp relief the different natterns
of emnlovment and compensation existing between men and women in the
Americanlabor market. Tn the nast decade, economists have turned
their attention to this problem, focusing nrimarilv on identifying and
measuring discrimination as the dominant force behind these differences.
More recently, Jacob Mincer and Solomon Polachek have investigated the
relationship between Individual investments in human canttal and sex
differences in earnings, establishing a clear and strong argument that
more than fifty percent of the existing differences in earnings may he
caused by sex differences in self—investment.
In this paner, I pursue the human capital argument by analyzing the
effect of differences in male and female labor force behavior on the firm's
incentiveto invest in workers. The model developed utilizes two assump-
tions: 1) The firm invests in the training of its workers: hence employee
turnover represents depreciation on human capital, and 2) the firm can affect
the turnover rate of its emnlovees by offering them a wage above the oppor-
tunity wage. Differences in exnected turnover behavior of men and women
are shown to he an important determinant of the incentive to the employer
to hire and train women as well as men. The major implications of the
model are the following:
1. The joint existence of emnloyer financed training and sex dif-
ferences in turnover is sufficient tonroduce wage differentials
between men and women in the absence of any taste for discrimination.
2. The relative wage of women and ouantitv of trainln invested in92
them will vary inversely with the volume ofspecific human canital
across occupations, holding constant relativeturnover rates of
men and women.
3. The relative number of womenemployed will vary inversely with
the volume of specific human capital investmentacross occupations,
holding constant sex differences in turnover behavior.
4. As the labor force characteristics ofwomen approach those of men,
across occupations and over time, their relativewage and occupa-
tional distribution will improve.
Despite data limitations on crucial variahle.s suchas true labor force
experience for women and labor turnover rates for bothmales and females,
empirical testing of the model on aggregate occupationaldata constructed
from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity confirmedthe theoretical
implications of the model. Severalproxy variables to capture labor force
turnover behavior were constructed: variance in weeksworked in 1966 by
men and women in a given occupation, percent of males and femalesin an
occupation whose current lob is not the same as thelongest lob held in
1966, and percent of males and females who worked 35 hoursor more per
week when employed in 1966. A measure of the volumeof on—the—lob training
across occupations was constructed from the exnerience—wage profileof
white males within occupations: the differenin average hourly wage
between those in each occupation with ten totwenty years of experience
and those with zero to ten years of experience.Tnvestment in on—the—lob
training is presumed to he concentrated early in the experiencehistory:
therefore this measure captures the difference between theaverage wage
earl.v in employment, when investment isrresnmah1y being financed, and a
later wage which includes returns to investment.Malor emoirical findings
of the analysis are the- following:1. Holding constant turnover rates of males and females, a dif-
ference between two occupations of .l0perhour per year in the
slore of the experience—wage profile, equivalent to a difference
of $200.00 per year per year in the exnerience—earnings profile,
at 2000 full time hours per year, implies an inverse difference
of 6.3 percent in the relative wage of women and 27.84 percent
in the relative number of women employed.
2. At the mean, training and sex differences in turnover combine
to explain between 45.10 percent and 102.44 percent of the relative
wage differential of women. Although these are noint estimates, with
no associated confidence intervals, there is strong reason to susnect
the lower number to he an underestimate: as the labor force behavior
of women truly arproached that of men, the coefficients of the female
earnings function would also approach those of the male earnings
function. Given differences in behavior, women act in such a way
that their own higher turnover is less costly to then. Therefore,
in askinthe question: 'Thatwould the wage of females he at
arbitrarilylower turnover rates?', wecaronly obtain anunder-
estimate. The greater the difference between the value of turnover
we nroose and the mean value for females, the more severe is the
underestimate.
As an additional test, the model was emnloyed to explain the earnings
and employment of black males relative to white males. Although formulated
in terms of males and females, it is clear that the model should apply to
any two groups who differ in labor force turnover behavior. Because of the
smaller differences in turnover characteristics between black and white men
than between white men and women, we expect training to have a smaller effect
n relative wage of black men and relative number enrnloyed. The emnirical94
findingsof this analysis were:
1.Holding constant turnover rates of black and whitemen
across occunations, a difference between two occunations of
$.l0nerhour per year in the slope of the. experience—wage
nrofile, eoulvalent to $200neryear per yearin th.e experience—
earningsprofile, impliesan Inverse difference of 3.98 percent
inthe relative wage of black men and 16.93 percent in the rela-
tive number o black men employed. oth these effects are smaller
than those observed for white women.
2. Training and differences in turnover behavior between black
and white men combine to explain between fifty and seventy ner—
cent of the relative wage differential of black men.
In addition to measuring the effects of training and differences in
turnover on wages and employment, an attemnt was made to discern the
effect of discrimination on wages of white women relative to whitemen
and of black men relative to white men. One indicator of discrimination
against women, or against blacks, would he a lower proportionate increase
in earnings associated with increases in education for them than for
white men. However, in none of the eouations presented in Tables 8 and
9 for white men and women and in Tables 23 and 24 for black and white.
men, does the coefficient on education differ significantly between
sexes or races. Therefore, there is no evidence of increasing discrim-
ination against women or against blacks with increasing education.
Wideningearnings differentials withincreasing education, to the ex-
tent that they exist, must he attributed to differences in post school
investment. Tn addition, neither women nor black men appear to com—
nensate for discrimination by being better educated thanwhite men,
sincethe average education of white men Is higher than that of blackmen andnot significantly different from that of white women, acros
occutations.Appendix
A-I.
Let a =0.Takinp thetotal. differential of the first order con-
ditions and makinp appropriate substitutions, the bordered hessian is
renre8ented by IT:
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